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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Interest of: 
ERIKA R. P , and 
VALLAREY L. P 
Persons under 18 years of age. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal brought by the mother of Erika and Vallarey 
P from the denial of a motion to set aside the Juvenile 
Court's order terminating parental rights of the mother. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, upon return to the State of Utah from Florida, 
petitioned the Second Juvenile Court, Judge Judith Whitmer, to set 
aside an order made by said Court terminating appellant's rights on 
the grounds that the State of Utah had not exercised diligent 
inquiry when attempting to serve and inform her of pending action, 
making the resultant service by publication inadequate and void. 
The motion of appellant was denied after the Court found suffi-
Case No. 
13882 
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cient diligence from the evidence presented. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the decision of the Juvenile 
Court denying the motion to set aside the Court's order of perma-
nent deprivation. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In November of 1973, the appellant took her two children to a 
friend's home to be taken care of for a few days (R.3). Direction 
was given to this friend, Mrs. Brown, to take the children to Mrs. 
Hattie P , Mother of the Natural Father (R. 2-3). Thereaf-
ter the appellant left for Florida (R.3) without telling anyone where 
she was going and for how long she would be gone (R.2-5). 
Appellant testified that while in Florida she wrote letters to 
Hattie P but never received any reply. None of these 
letters were returned to her. Appellant said she was not worried or 
didn't think it was strange that Hattie did not answer (R.7). 
No contact was made with any friend, family, or acquaintance 
from November 1973 until March or April 1974 when appellant 
contacted her sister who said the children were fine (R.4) when in 
fact the children were no longer with Hattie but were under the care 
of the Division of Family Services (R.19). 
No further contact was made between the appellant and anyone 
in Salt Lake (according to all testimony given) until appellant 
returned to Utah. Thereafter it took 2-3 weeks for the appellant to 
contact anyone who would know about the children (R.8). 
Betty Mattson, a foster care worker for the Division of Family 
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Services testified that she felt it necessary to deprive the parents of 
the children because of circumstances amounting to abandonment, 
for no contact or word had been made with the children or anyone 
who was in charge of the children for over six months (R.20). 
Irl Carlson, caseworker for the Division of Family Services, 
testified that he checked at the post office to see if the appellant or 
the father were receiving mail in the Salt Lake Valley or had left a 
forwarding address (R.17). He further checked at the Baywood 
Hotel where the children had been residing for a while, (R. 17). He 
checked with Utah Power and Light to see if the appellant or the 
father were customers of the company (R.18). 
Darrell Meyers, another worker for the Division of Family 
Services went to the home of Hattie P to see if she knew 
the whereabouts of the appellant; she did not know (R.18). He 
further looked through the telephone book for the name of the 
appellant's mother, but did not find it (R.19). 
Lu Jean Smith, another case worker, also went to Hattie's to 
see if she could find out where appellant was (R.20) and at the 
same time checked with neighbors in the neighborhood where the 
appellant last resided (R.20). All efforts were to no avail. 
Service by publication was permitted based on the affidavit of 
Irl Carlson alleging the foregoing (R. 17-18). Neither the appellant 
nor the father were present at the shelter hearing in January 1974, 
or the proceedings on July 16, 1974, at which time an order was 
entered terminating rights (R.17). The reason the appellant or 
father were not present was because of the inability to locate them 
(R.17). 
After the return of the appellant from Florida and within the 
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time period permitted to challenge the order before it became final 
(R.l), the appellant moved to set aside the order on the grounds 
that no "diligent" effort had been made to locate her and inform 
her of the proceedings. The Court's Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Lw clearly set forth the Court's reasons for holding that a 
diligent effort as required by Utah Code Annotated, Section 
55-10-88 had been met and therefore denied the motion (R.30). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STATE MET ALL LEGAL AND PRO-
CEDURAL REQUIREMENTS TO LOCATE THE 
APPELLANT, MAKING SERVICE BY PUBLICA-
TION TOTALLY PERMISSIBLE AND BINDING 
ON THE PARTIES TO THIS ACTION. 
Respondent cannot help but agree with appellant's contention 
that the deprivation of parental rights is a drastic action which must 
be handled through In Personum procedures. Children are not 
realty, and rights pertaining to them must be handled with care and 
proper procedure. Appellant, however, wants this Court to believe 
that such is an absolute standard which has very few exceptions, if 
at all. This Court, as well as most every jurisdiction, recognizes 
many ways personal jurisdiction can be perfected over parties — 
even if they do not receive actual notice. Those procedures are 
spelled out clearly and require little discussion here. 
It is important to note that the Utah Supreme Court has enter-
tained this precise question earlier holding that jurisdiction 
through publication is totally permissible and does not fail for lack 
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oi due procedural safeguards when the inai.onn :-nd•» compliance 
with ine Maim;:* .wo n;k- lis //'"•.,; . Hard ^utu mi />/ /;:« t 
Court in andjor Salt Lake Counn, 2 ' Uah :d33 : ,4soP 2d 1262 
(1972), this Court recognized the right to use publication when the 
party to be served is out of the State or has so concealed himself 
within the State making personal service impossible. The Service 
by i>i*hiiv<iti-.,;i was challenged as denying due process to the 
DefendanK . h u the Utah ('ouri Mated -> -ost emphatically that such 
service of process is pemussihic 
Appellant's contentions that Article 1, Secth-h ,: oi >hc luaii 
Constitution prohibits the actions conducted in this case as a denial 
of due process of !.** , ;.i> / therefore be dismissed as having been 
settled b\ die ulnne ca%c Simply hu.ai!-;c ^cn^l ivUice is not 
receded dot^ IM^ mean thai due process Has bee/' diveed. 
Rule 4 (f) (1) of tl i.e Utah Rules of Cm! Procedure carefully 
spells out the procedure necessary for service by publication. The 
trial court is charged with the responsibility to make the decision if 
"due diligence" has beer; met. Utah Code Annotated. Section 
55-10-88, furth:! M. V.,S.-. m;>t in cases such ;*s?h,e ;mtiKtM' m Jhe 
instant matter: 
"(4) If tl le parei its, pai ent oi ^uaidian u.qunCu io 
be summoned under section 55-10-87 cannot hi found 
within the state, thefactof their childs pre\* *u c -\ nhin 
the state shai! r onfer jurisdiction ,»" -ltr * '• or ** •••'* 
ceedina- //• * u^atcn •• • <« • /jwfer f/n's <i. / ^ ' > .••'/* 
absent parent or guardian, provided that dtu* nun * ti.i^  
been given in the f-M- UHIO manner; 
* :§:: * 
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(b) If the address or whereabouts of the parent or 
guardian outside the state cannot after diligent inquiry 
be ascertained, by publishing a summons in a news-
paper having general circulation in the county in which 
the proceeding is pending. The summons shall be pub-
lished once a week for four successive weeks. Service 
shall be complete on the day of the last publication." 
(Emphasis added) 
This procedure when followed permits the Court, in a legal and 
equitable sense, to adjudicate the matters before it. As the Ok-
lahoma Court said in Bomford v. Socony Mobile Oil Co., 440 P. 2d 
713 (Okl., 1968): 
"Due diligence is a relative term lacking a fixed 
content. It presents a question for judicial determina-
tion which must be decided in the first instance by the 
trial court.'' (Emphasis added) 
Further, in Knapp v. Sloper, 473 P.2d 140 (Or., 1970) that 
Court held that due diligence requires a "reasonable effort" to 
show why the party could not be found. Such reasonableness must 
be defined by the terms or circumstances of a particular case, and if 
the Court of first instance finds them sufficient, due process is met. 
Appellant cites Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Committee v. 
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 71 S. Ct. 624, 95 L.Ed 817 (1951) to 
express certain criteria which must be followed to insure due 
process to the nonpresent defendant. These criteria are analyzed as 
follows: (1) The nature of the action is known, having been set up 
by the legislature for the protection of the interests of children 
within this state. (2) The procedure is carefully set forth as pro-
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vided by statute.(3) The testimony and total circumstances of the 
case clearly establish why the action was taken — the parents had 
abandoned the children, had not contacted them for nearly 10 
months, left no indication that she was in the least interested in 
their welfare. Surely the self serving declarations of love and 
affection as expressed by the appellant must be viewed in the 
context of the whole. (4) The only other alternative was to leave 
the state of the children in "limbo" not knowing whether parents 
(or appellant) would return or not. The welfare of the children 
required action to be taken and it was. Now, inspite of the lack of 
affection of the mother over this entire time period, she raises to 
this court the argument that due process was not followed. She 
complains of action she forced the State to take. 
The record leaves the distinct impression that appellant did not 
want anyone—not even her relatives—to know where she had 
gone. She could have taken her children with her, but she was in 
trouble with the law (R.6). This was a "self-induced hiding" not 
letting anyone know where she was or why. 
It is true that her affidavit explains where she was, but the 
affidavit in several places is contradicted by appellant's own 
testimony. She said she received a letter from Hattie P , 
but under oath denied making any contact (R.25, and R. 8). She 
stated in her affidavit that she was unsuccessful in contacting her 
mother until July (R. 26), when under oath she testified that she 
contacted her mother through her sister in March and April (R.4). 
Further she stated in the affidavit that Hattie P knew the 
address, that her mother knew her address, and that "all my family 
and friends knew I was in Tampa, Florida" (R. 26)! Yet, all the 
evidence presented at the hearing indicated otherwise. Such con-
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tradiction and self serving statements must be viewed in context of 
the whole. When done so, in light of the criteria of Joint 
Anti-Facist, there is no question that the process was in com-
pliance with due process. The state cannot now be chastised for 
acting on information that did not exist and could not be found at 
the time the action was taken. The State thus acted in compliance 
with all procedural and legal requirements. 
POINT II 
THE JUVENILE COURT'S FINDING THAT THE 
STATE MET THE DUE DILIGENCE REQUIRE-
MENT IS SUBSTANTIATED BY THE EVIDENCE 
Appellant would have this Court believe that as long as there is 
one person or two persons who know the whereabouts of the party 
to be served, that the other side (here the State) is obligated to keep 
searching until that person is found. This is an admirable theory, 
but one which cannot be accepted. To place this type of burden on 
parties would totally prohibit any action at all—who is to know 
that such a "knowledgeable" person exists. Further, what is to 
guarantee that such person would divulge the location even if 
found. 
It is respondent's contention that such a strict standard as 
propounded by Appellant's counsel is unrealistic in today's soci-
ety. If the Court of first instance finds from the circumstances that 
"due diligence" has been made, such a decision should be af-
firmed absent a showing of abuse. The Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law of this case give ample exposure to the 
diligence conducted: 
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"(a) They inquired of the neighbors in the area 
where the mother had last resided. 
(b) They inquired of the babysitter with whom the 
children had been left who did not know the whereab-
outs of the parents. 
(c) There was no forwarding address left at the 
postoffice or at the last home address of the parents. 
(d) They inquired of the mother of the natural father 
who did not know the whereabouts of the mother and 
father. 
(e) They tried all of the people with the mother's 
surname listed in the telephone book in an attempt to 
locate the maternal grandmother." (R. 29 & 30) 
The particulars to these findings of fact are set forth in 
respondent's statement of facts and clearly substantiate the basis 
for the findings made. 
The Federal District Court for the Northern District of Indiana 
had a similar situation presented to it mMilosaujevic v. Brooks, 55 
F.R.D. 543 (N.D. IND., 1972) where the Court found that "by 
leaving the state and concealing her present location, has made 
more adequate forms of service unreasonable and impracticable." 
There, the Court found the following as being proper for service by 
publication. Publication was made in a paper of the last known 
address (that also was done here). Service was attempted at the last 
known address (service was not attempted, but Social Workers 
visited the area of Appellant's last known address and even talked 
with neighbors, but could find no clue). The mother-in-law was 
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contacted (here Hattie P was contacted—the grand-
mother of the children as well as the baby-sitter). And, the insur-
ance carrier was contacted (inapplicable here). Based on these four 
acts, the District Court found diligent effort. 
In this particular case, as cited in the Court's Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law as well as in the statement of facts, it is 
clearly observed that sufficient acts were done to satisfy the Court 
that due diligence was complete. 
Appellant makes the attempt to belittle the efforts of the De-
partment of Social Services by listing several sources of informa-
tion the Department should have checked. In analyzing these other 
records it is seen that they would have added nothing in attempts to 
locate the appellant. Vital statistics only give addresses at time of 
birth and only the names of parents. Evidence at the hearing 
indicated moving around and thus the address of several years 
before was undoubtedly out of date. To go to the Hospital and find 
out the doctor's name who "might " have a continuing relation-
ship is most assuredly a stretch of the imagination under the rule. 
Once again, it must be emphasized that if every person who knew 
the appellant had to be contacted first, then in effect it would do 
away with the rule. Tax rolls would not help to locate the appel-
lant. Such records are awkward and burdensome and could not 
locate the appellant out of state. Automobile registration and 
drivers' license records were not valid sources because no change 
of address (for leaving the state) was given and the Department 
already knew her last known address. Judicial Records and city 
records tell little more than what the Department already knew. 
This foregoing analysis is only to indicate that though there are 
countless records that "could" be searched, neither the law, 
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reason, nor practicality require such extensive investigations. If, 
under the circumstances, the Court finds that enough was done, 
that decision should be upheld. Indeed, there is ample evidence to 
indicate such diligence, for three workers for the State each made 
attempts. 
This Court said in Redwood Land v. Kimball, 20 Utah 2d 113, 
433P.2d 1010 (1967) that: 
' 'When the procedure prescribed for the acquisition 
of jurisdiction of the defendant has been properly car-
ried out that is, when there has been a correct service of 
a proper summons, a mistake of this kind (Failing to 
'prove' service within 5 days) does not destroy the 
validity of the service itself.'' 
Here, there was proper service (publication as per the rules and 
direction of the Court) of a proper summons. No mistake was made 
in the instant matter, for the Court made a judicial determination 
that proper "diligence" had been carried out. Therefore, the 
validity, as well as the jurisdiction of the Court was proper, 
making the order thereof enforceable. 
POINT III 
STATUTORY LANGUAGE DOES NOT REQUIRE 
ABSOLUTE KNOWLEDGE THAT THE APPEL-
LANT WAS OUTSIDE OF THE STATE IN ORDER 
FOR SERVICE BY PUBLICATION TO BE BIND-
ING. 
Appellant reads something into the language of Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 55-10-88, that does not appear. The statute, as 
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quoted earlier, states that if the parents "cannot be found within 
the state" then publication is permissible if the address outside the 
state cannot be ascertained. In the present action, the appellant was 
in fact outside the state. Any new address of the Appellant could 
not be ascertained; Appellant could not be found within the state 
and no indication of where she had gone was available. Appellant 
left no word of her whereabouts for months and in fact, testified 
that it didn't bother her that nobody wrote (R.7), if it can be 
believed that anyone did know her whereabouts. Such facts clearly 
satisfy the requirements as prescribed by the Utah Code. 
The fact that the State could not find any indication of what had 
happened to the Appellant shows that no more could be done and 
that as this Court stated in Lloyd, supra: 
On the other hand, a summons published once a 
week for four successive weeks in a newspaper having 
general circulation in the county wherein the plaintiff 
resides would likely be seen by the defendant or by 
some acquaintance or relative of the defendant who 
would give notice of the pending matter to him." 
Therefore, the State did all it could to look out for the welfare 
of the children who were left without thought or regard by the 
Appellant and who made no more than a feeble attempt at most to 
communicate to them or anyone knowing their condition. This 
argument must therefore be considered without merit since the 
code specifically permits publication when the parents are "in 
fact" outside the state. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing analysis, it is clear that procedural 
safeguards and due diligence on the part of the State have been 
complied with, thus requiring this Court to affirm the decision of 
the lower Court. 
THEREFORE, the Respondent respectfully submits that the 
denial of the Motion appealed from be sustained. 
Respectfully subnitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
FRANK V. NELSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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